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2016 TRADEMARK YEAR IN REVIEW 
Mark P. McKenna & Shelby Niemann∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
This brief Essay reviews some of the most significant developments in 
trademark law during the past year.  In most cases, we have interpreted 
“year” fairly liberally, particularly to highlight some longer-term trends.  
We focus on six areas: (1) the constitutionality of section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act; (2) the Fourth Circuit’s Belmora decision and the availability 
of section 43(a) claims when the plaintiff has not used a mark in the United 
States; (3) the effect of B & B Hardware; (4) injunctive relief and the 
presumption of irreparable harm; (5) nominative fair use; and (6) initial 
interest confusion.  
I.     IN RE TAM 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act continued to dominate trademark 
news this year, as it has the last couple of years.  But this year an Asian 
rock band stole the spotlight from the Washington football team, giving us 
a Supreme Court battle.1  
In In re Tam, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overturned the 
Trademark Office’s refusal to register the band name THE SLANTS, 
finding the disparagement bar on which the Trademark Office based the 
refusal to be unconstitutional.2  Expressly overruling In re McGinley,3 the 
Federal Circuit held that the prohibition on registering disparaging marks 
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to the Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
∗  Mark P. McKenna is Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Professor of Law, 
and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law School.  Shelby Niemann is a J.D. 
Candidate at Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2018.    
 1  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lee v. Tam on September 29, 2016.  See In 
re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (U.S. Sept. 
19, 2016) (No. 15-1293).   
 2  In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1327, 1358.  The Federal Circuit took the case sua sponte en 
banc after a panel of the court affirmed the Trademark Office’s rejection of the mark but 
cast doubt on the constitutionality of section 2(a).  See In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (ordering that the case be heard en banc); In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 
(Fed. Cir. 2015).   
 3 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1; see In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 
1981) (holding section 2(a) constitutional on the ground that denial of registration does not 
proscribe any conduct or suppress any tangible form of expression).   
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did not survive strict scrutiny because: (1) it is not content or viewpoint 
neutral; (2) it regulates the expressive aspects of a mark, not its function as 
commercial speech; (3) it is not government speech or a government 
subsidy; and (4) it would not pass the Central Hudson test even if it were a 
regulation of commercial speech.4  
Much has already been said about the difficult First Amendment 
questions raised by Tam, and surely much more will be said in the coming 
months.  We highlight three points here: (1) the significance of denial of 
federal registration; (2) the problem with focusing on content and 
viewpoint neutrality; and (3) the question of whether commercial speech 
will continue to receive different treatment.  
The consequences of a denial of federal registration may turn out to be 
central to the case.  First, the Court’s understanding of the consequences of 
denial of registration is likely to determine the broad framing of the case.  
To the extent the Court sees the registration bar as an effective prohibition 
on speech, it is likely to subject the provision to strict scrutiny (whether it is 
characterized as content-based or viewpoint-based), and the 
constitutionality of the provision will be a function of the government’s 
interest in prohibiting registration of disparaging terms and whether 
section 2(a) is narrowly tailored to that interest.  
If, on the other hand, the Court recognizes that denial of a registration 
does not prohibit any speech (i.e., does not impose any criminal or civil 
penalties for speech but merely denies benefits), then it is more likely to 
view the case through the lens of government program or government 
speech cases.5  In that case, the issue will be whether denial of the benefits 
of registration is significant enough that it amounts to government 
leveraging of its funding to control speech outside of the government 
program.6  
The conventional wisdom has long been that denial (or cancellation) 
of registration not only does not prevent use of a mark, it does not even 
 
 4 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334, 1337–39, 1351, 1355–57; see Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (outlining four-part 
analysis).   
 5 See Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (holding 
that Texas specialty license plate designs were government speech, and the state board 
therefore did not violate a nonprofit organization's free speech rights by denying its 
application for a design with a Confederate flag); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).  
 6 See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2330, 2332 (2013) (invalidating the federal government’s attempt to limit a funding 
program for efforts to stop the spread of HIV and AIDS to organizations that have explicit 
policies against prostitution and sex trafficking on the ground that “[b]y demanding that 
funding recipients adopt—as their own—the Government’s view on an issue of public 
concern,” the government had impermissibly leveraged its funds to influence speech 
“outside the scope of the federally funded program” (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197)).   
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prevent enforcement of the mark under federal law (particularly 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act).7  Denial simply means that the mark will 
not receive any of the benefits of registration.  The mark will not be 
presumed valid,8 nor will it be eligible for incontestable status.9  The mark 
owner will not get to claim nationwide rights by virtue of statutory 
constructive use.10  The government also will not seize imported goods 
bearing the claimed mark, since only goods bearing registered trademarks 
are subject to forfeiture.11  And none of the civil or criminal counterfeiting 
provisions will apply, as counterfeits are by definition those that make 
unauthorized use of registered marks.12  These consequences are not 
meaningless, of course, but they fall far short of unenforceability.   
The Federal Circuit cast considerable doubt on this understanding of 
registration, however, in In re Tam.  Echoing a small number of prior 
district court cases,13 the Federal Circuit strongly suggested that marks 
barred from registration under section 2 were unenforceable as a matter of 
federal law, and likely as a matter of state law as well.14  There are 
reasonable arguments to be made about how we should understand the 
relationship between registration and enforcement of unregistered rights, 
and this is not the only setting in which that issue has recently come to the 
fore.  For our purposes it is enough to note that much more than the 
section 2(a) bars are at stake if the Supreme Court were to embrace the 
Federal Circuit’s thinking and accept that denial of registration entails lack 
 
 7 Section 43(a) prohibits use of:  
[A]ny word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).   
 8  Id. § 1057(b). 
 9  Id. § 1065.   
 10  Id. § 1057(c).   
 11  19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)–(b) (2012).   
 12  15 U.S.C. § 1116(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).   
 13  See, e.g., Renna v. Cty. of Union, 88 F. Supp. 3d 310, 321 (D.N.J. 2014).   
 14  In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (suggesting that “it is unclear 
whether Mr. Tam could actually enforce any common law rights to a disparaging mark,” 
and calling the government’s suggestion that Tam could fall back on common law rights 
“illusionary”).  The earlier panel decision had been less equivocal, stating flatly that 
unregistrable marks are not protectable under federal or state law.  See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 
567, 576 (Fed Cir. 2015) (“Not only is a disparaging trademark denied federal registration, 
but it cannot be protected by its owner by virtue of a § 43(a) unfair competition claim.” 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))); see also id. at 577 (“[N]ot only are the benefits of federal 
registration unavailable to Mr. Tam, so too are the benefits of trademark registration in 
nearly all states.”).   
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of enforceability.  For one thing, it is difficult to see how such a conclusion 
could be limited to the disparagement bar or even to section 2(a).  For if the 
unregistrability of a mark establishes its unprotectability (because the 
exclusions in section 2 reflect public policies that also apply to unregistered 
marks),15 then it is not clear why one would not draw the same conclusion 
about all the bases for denial of registration.  A conclusion that the 
disparagement bar is unconstitutional because denial of registration entails 
unprotectability could then have much broader effects on trademark law 
and practice, requiring a fundamental rethinking of the relationship 
between registration and protection of unregistered marks.   
There is another way in which the Court will have to grapple with the 
extent to which the section 2(a) limitations can be distinguished from the 
rest of section 2, and perhaps even the rest of the Lanham Act, if it agrees 
with the Federal Circuit that the disparagement bar is unconstitutional.16  
Section 2 prohibits registration of, among other things, generic and 
descriptive terms; marks that consist of or comprise the flag or coat of arms 
or other insignia of the United States; marks likely to be confused with 
prior marks; and primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive 
marks.17  All of these prohibitions are content-based, so if the problem with 
the disparagement bar is that it is not content neutral, then all of section 2 is 
unconstitutional.  And so, likely, are all of the important provisions of the 
Lanham Act, since infringement and dilution obviously depend on the 
content of that party’s mark.   
It is possible that the Court could distinguish the disparagement bar on 
the ground that, like many of the other section 2(a) bars but unlike most of 
the remaining section 2 bars, the disparagement bar is not just content-
based, it is viewpoint-based.  Section 2(a) prohibits registration of THE 
SLANTS not only because of its content, but because the government 
disapproves of the disparaging message of the mark.  Positive, non-
disparaging references to people of Asian descent are allowed; only 
negative references are disallowed.  It is worth noting, however, that as a 
matter of First Amendment doctrine, it is actually quite rare for a case to 
turn on the distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based 
 
 15 Rebecca Tushnet makes this argument in her excellent piece on registration.  See 
Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark 
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867 (2017).   
 16  The Federal Circuit expressly limited its decision to the constitutionality of the 
disparagement provision, though it is hard to imagine the rest of section 2(a) would survive 
under the court’s analysis.  See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1 (“We limit our holding in 
this case to the constitutionality of the § 2(a) disparagement provision.  Recognizing, 
however, that other portions of § 2 may likewise constitute government regulation of 
expression based on message, such as the exclusions of immoral or scandalous marks, we 
leave to future panels the consideration of the § 2 provisions other than the disparagement 
provision at issue here.”).   
 17  15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)–(e).   
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regulations—a distinction the Supreme Court has acknowledged is “not a 
precise one.”18   
More to the point, whether one regards the disparagement bar as 
viewpoint-based depends on whether that is to be judged from the 
perspective of the speaker or the audience.  That matters because it’s quite 
clear that the PTO refuses registration of marks it deems disparaging 
regardless of the viewpoint of the applicant.  Indeed, the facts of In re Tam 
prove the point—Tam claimed that he should not be denied registration 
because he was trying to reclaim the term to strip it of its disparaging 
meaning.  But that purpose was irrelevant to the mark’s registrability 
because disparagement is judged from the perspective of a “substantial 
composite” of the relevant group.19  As a result, section 2(a) can only be 
regarded as viewpoint based if the viewpoint of the audience rather than 
the viewpoint of the speaker controls.  Perhaps it does, though the cases the 
Federal Circuit cited for that proposition are not clearly on point here.20   
 
 18  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).  The 
distinction seems to matter only in cases involving public forums, so unless the Court is 
prepared to hold that the registration system creates a limited public forum, this distinction 
would seem out of place here.   
 19  In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331 (quoting U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1203.03(b)(i) (2015)).   
 20  The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he legal significance of viewpoint discrimination 
is the same whether the government disapproves of the message or claims that some part of 
the populace will disapprove of the message.”  Id. at 1336.  According to the Federal 
Circuit, “[t]his point is recognized in the Supreme Court’s long-standing condemnation of 
government impositions on speech based on adverse reactions among the public.”  Id. (first 
citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011); then citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992); and then citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).  Of those 
cases, R.A.V. is the most analogous.  That case involved an ordinance that prohibited the 
display of a symbol that one knows or has reason to know “arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”  R.A.V., 505 U.S. 
at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 292.02 (1990)).  The Court found 
the ordinance unconstitutional because it was content-based, but its focus was on the fact 
that the ordinance prohibited speech that produced an effect (arousing anger, alarm or 
resentment) only when the effect was due to race, color, creed, religion, or gender.  Id. at 
391 (“Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are 
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.”).  But note 
that the Court juxtaposed those kinds of regulations of “fighting words” with more 
categorical prohibitions that are more analogous to section 2(a):  
Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for example—would be 
prohibited to proponents of all views.  But “fighting words” that do not 
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a 
person's mother, for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the 
placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but 
could not be used by those speakers' opponents. 
Id.  Contra Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315, 321 (1988) (holding that a law prohibiting 
display of any sign within five hundred feet of a foreign embassy, if the sign would tend to 
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Finally, there is the question of whether the government will get 
greater deference here because the registration bars regulated commercial 
speech, unlike the regulations at issue in most of the other cases involving 
content-based or viewpoint-based regulations.  The Federal Circuit said 
that it did not get greater deference because the disparagement bar regulates 
the expressive aspects of a mark, not its function as commercial speech.  
According to the Federal Circuit:  
[I]t is always a mark's expressive character, not its ability to serve as a 
source identifier, that is the basis for the disparagement exclusion from 
registration.  The disparagement provision must be assessed under First 
Amendment standards applicable to what it targets, which is not the 
commercial-speech function of the mark.21   
That approach is notable for several reasons.  First, it is hard to 
imagine that the sort of disentanglement the Federal Circuit’s approach 
requires would be workable.22  If it would not, then courts will have to 
decide whether marks with expressive value should be treated as 
commercial or non-commercial speech.  If the Federal Circuit is right that 
courts should treat these mixed character marks as non-commercial, then it 
is unclear why the marks are otherwise registrable.  As Judge Reyna asked 
in his dissent: 
[I]f the expressive content of the mark precludes regulation, on 
what authority may the government grant Mr. Tam the exclusive right 
to use this mark in commerce?  Whatever standard of scrutiny protects 
the content of Mr. Tam's trademark from government regulation, that 
same standard must necessarily be overcome by the government's 
substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce, or no trademark 
could issue.23  
Perhaps even more significantly, if courts are to begin focusing on the 
expressive content of marks and subjecting their regulation to strict 
scrutiny despite their commercial character, that could have truly 
revolutionary consequences in the infringement and dilution contexts.  Use 
of a party’s mark in part for its expressive value—which, given the 
difficulty in disentangling the expressive from the commercial, might 
include a large number of uses—would trigger First Amendment scrutiny.  
 
bring that foreign government into “public odium” or “disrepute,” was content-based but not 
viewpoint-based).   
 21  In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338.   
 22  See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 
(“[W]here, as here, the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we 
cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another 
phrase.  Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical.”).   
 23  In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting).   
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And since protecting ordinary commercial interests typically is not enough 
to satisfy strict scrutiny, the consequences here could be enormous.24   
II.     BELMORA25 
In his 2014 Year in Review,26 Professor McKenna suggested that, by 
focusing courts’ attention on the “zone of interests” protected under the 
Lanham Act and proximate causation, the Supreme Court’s Lexmark 
decision might make courts more skeptical of claims of harm in more 
expansive trademark infringement actions.27  The jury is still out on that 
prediction.  But the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Belmora LLC v. Bayer 
Consumer Care AG suggests that Lexmark has had some influence on the 
way courts understand the scope of section 43(a), and particularly on the 
question of whether a plaintiff must have trademark rights in order to 
pursue a claim under that section.28   
Belmora involved one company, Bayer Consumer Care AG (BCC), 
that owned the trademark “FLANAX” in Mexico and had sold naproxen 
sodium pain relievers under that mark in Mexico (and other parts of Latin 
America) since the 1970s.29  Another company, Belmora LLC, owned the 
FLANAX trademark in the United States and had used the mark in the 
United States since 2004 for its own naproxen sodium pain relievers.30  
BCC successfully petitioned to cancel Belmora's registration for the 
FLANAX mark on the ground the mark was deceptive.31  Belmora 
appealed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) decision to the 
Eastern District of Virginia.  In the meantime, Bayer filed a separate 
complaint against Belmora for false association under section 43 of the 
Lanham Act.  “BCC and its U.S. sister company Bayer Healthcare LLC 
(‘BHC,’ and collectively with BCC, ‘Bayer’) contend[ed] that Belmora 
used the FLANAX mark [in the United States] to deliberately deceive 
 
 24  Among other things, it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court could embrace such 
an approach without overruling S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 
U.S. 522 (1987).   
 25  Portions of this Part are adapted from Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux 
Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288 (Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh ed., 2013).   
 26  The 2014 Trademark Year in Review, like this Year in Review, was originally 
prepared for the Houston Intellectual Property Law Association and University of Houston 
Institute for Intellectual Property & Information Law’s annual Fall Institute.  See Mark P. 
McKenna, Trademark Year in Review (Feb. 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2645863.  
 27  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014); see 
also McKenna, supra note 26, at 12–14.   
 28  819 F.3d 697, 706 (4th Cir. 2016).   
 29  Id. at 701.   
 30  Id.   
 31  Id. at 702.   
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Mexican-American consumers into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s 
product.”32  After the two cases were consolidated, the district court 
reversed the TTAB’s cancellation order and dismissed the false association 
and false advertising claims.33  Bayer appealed.   
As the Fourth Circuit put it, the case required consideration of 
“whether the Lanham Act permits the owner of a foreign trademark and its 
sister company to pursue false association, false advertising, and trademark 
cancellation claims against the owner of the same mark in the United 
States.”34  That’s a particularly difficult question because it’s not just an 
issue of whether a party that lacks trademark rights can assert a claim under 
section 43(a), but rather a question of whether it matters that the claimant is 
a foreign company that lacks U.S. trademark rights because it has never 
used the mark in the United States.  That is, Belmora has important 
implications for the territoriality of trademark rights.   
On the general question of whether a party that does not have 
trademark rights can assert a claim under section 43(a), the court noted that 
“the plain language of § 43(a) does not require that a plaintiff possess or 
have used a trademark in U.S. commerce as an element of the cause of 
action.”35  Indeed, in that respect, “§ 43(a) stands in sharp contrast to . . . 
§ 32, which is titled as and expressly addresses ‘infringement.’”36   
That argument resonates with the traditional distinction between 
trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Registration under pre-
Lanham Act statutes was available only to “technical trademarks,” which 
were distinguished from mere “trade names” and other matter that did not 
indicate the source of a party’s goods.37  Limitations on registration were 
important because pre-Lanham Act statutes gave a federal cause of action 
only to owners of registered trademarks whose marks were used by others 
 
 32  Id. at 701–02.   
 33  Id. at 702. 
 34  Id. at 701.   
 35  Id. at 706. 
 36  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012)).   
 37  Arbitrary or fanciful terms as applied to particular products were considered 
technical trademarks, and they were protected in actions for trademark infringement.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1995); see also 1 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:4 (4th ed. 
2016) (defining technical trademarks as marks that were “fanciful, arbitrary, distinctive, 
non-descriptive in any sense and not a personal name” (first citing Milton Handler & 
Charles Pickett, Trade-marks and Trade Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV. 168, 169 (1930); and then citing G.W. Cole Co. v. Am. Cement & Oil Co., 130 F. 
703 (7th Cir. 1904))).  Trade names included surnames, geographic terms, and descriptive 
terms—what we would now refer to as non-inherently distinctive designations.  MCCARTHY, 
supra, § 4:5.  Federal registration also was limited to marks used in interstate commerce, or 
commerce with foreign nations or Indian tribes.  See Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 1, 
33 Stat. 724, 724 (“[T]he owner of a trade-mark used in commerce with foreign nations, or 
among the several States, or with Indian tribes . . . may obtain registration. . . .”).   
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in interstate commerce.38  Thus, only the owners of technical trademarks 
that had taken the initiative to register their marks could bring federal 
claims.  Those claims under federal statutes were denominated trademark 
infringement actions because by definition they involved the use of 
technical trademarks.  Unfair competition claims, by contrast, were 
common-law claims available to those that did not own technical 
trademarks and therefore could not have received a federal registration or 
brought a federal claim.39   
This divided state of affairs continued through the early years of the 
Lanham Act, though not without growing concern among some of the 
Lanham Act’s advocates that the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie would 
lead to disuniformity in the law of unfair competition.40  Those advocates 
believed the new federal statute needed to provide a federal statutory basis 
for unfair competition claims, and some even claimed that the Lanham Act 
in fact provided such a basis.  Edward Rogers, one of the Lanham Act’s 
primary drafters, focused particularly on section 44, which he argued could 
be interpreted broadly to create the federal law of unfair competition.41  A 
few courts initially accepted that view,42 but one had to read section 44 
quite creatively to find in it a federal unfair competition cause of action.  
Most courts therefore turned their attention to section 43(a)—first to 
ground a federal unfair competition claim in cases not involving 
 
 38  See Trademark Act of 1905, § 16 (creating cause of action for infringement of 
registered marks); see also id. § 17 (granting federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving 
use of a registered mark in interstate commerce).  The requirement that the defendant’s use 
affect interstate commerce was, formerly, a real limitation.  See U.S. Printing & Lithograph 
Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279 U.S. 156, 157–59 (1929) (refusing the plaintiff’s claim 
under the 1905 Act that the defendant infringed its registered “Home Brand” trademark, 
which the plaintiff used in “certain named States of the northwest” by printing and selling 
labels containing the word “Home,” on the ground that the defendant’s activities took place 
only within the limits of the state of Ohio and did not interfere with interstate commerce).   
 39  McKenna, supra note 25, at 291.  Not every mark eligible to be registered was in 
fact registered.  Consequently, although all federal claims were trademark infringement 
claims, not all trademark infringement claims were federal claims.  There were also 
common law trademark infringement claims, brought to vindicate exclusive rights in 
unregistered trademarks, though many courts conflated those claims with unfair competition 
claims—seeing trademark infringement claims as one category consisting of claims under 
the federal statute, and common law unfair competition claims as the other category 
consisting of any claim not based on a registered mark.  Id. at 290–96. 
 40  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. 
Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition, 42 COLUM. L. 
REV. 955 (1942).   
 41  See Edward S. Rogers, Introduction to DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK 
MANUAL: A HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, at 
xvi–xxi (1947) (arguing that section 44(h) of the statute should be understood to give courts 
the ability to develop a uniform body of federal unfair competition law).   
 42  See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 342–43 (9th Cir. 1952); 
Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1950).   
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trademarks but other false statements,43 and then eventually to allow 
federal claims for infringement of unregistered trademarks and trade 
dress.44   
To fit these latter types of claims into the text of the statute, courts 
interpreted the term “origin” broadly to refer not only to geographic origin 
but also to origin of manufacture.  The Supreme Court has on occasion 
shown some doubts about the legitimacy of that interpretation, but it has 
now clearly accepted the conclusion that section 43(a) provides a cause of 
action for infringement of unregistered marks.45   
Insofar as we see section 43(a) primarily as a replacement for 
common-law unfair competition claims, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation 
in Belmora makes some sense.  Unfair competition claims by definition 
involved unregistered, and most commonly unregistrable, subject matter, so 
it would be odd to read into section 43(a) a requirement that the plaintiff 
demonstrate ownership of a trademark.  The problem with that approach is 
that federal courts have spent the better part of the last fifty years 
eviscerating the distinction between trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, primarily for the purpose of eliminating the additional proof 
requirements that once attended unfair competition actions.  Indeed, unfair 
competition has been so assimilated into trademark law that courts 
routinely insist that there is no meaningful difference between the 
infringement of registered and unregistered marks.46  It is therefore not 
surprising that so many of the Fourth Circuit’s pre-Belmora cases treated 
the plaintiff’s use of a mark in U.S. commerce as a prerequisite for a 
section 43(a) claim.47   
 
 43  See, e.g., L’Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 650 (3d Cir. 
1954).   
 44  See, e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625, 
630 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Catalina, Inc. v. Gem Swimwear, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 911, 912 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).   
 45  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2003) 
(“Although a case can be made that a proper reading of § 43(a), as originally enacted, would 
treat the word ‘origin’ as referring only ‘to the geographic location in which the goods 
originated,’ the Courts of Appeals considering the issue, beginning with the Sixth Circuit, 
unanimously concluded that it ‘does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also to 
origin of source or manufacture,’ thereby creating a federal cause of action for traditional 
trademark infringement of unregistered marks.” (footnote omitted) (first quoting Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 777 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); and then 
quoting Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408 (1963))).    
 46  See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects 
qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for 
registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining 
whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).” (citations omitted)).   
 47  See Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 709 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Both infringement [under 
§ 32] and false designation of origin [under § 43(a)] have [the same] five elements.” 
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Perhaps Belmora portends a return to the old days, when trademark 
infringement and unfair competition were more clearly distinct causes of 
action.  We think that might actually be a welcome development, though 
we should think carefully about the requirements for proving unfair 
competition rather than simply treating it as an infringement claim without 
the requirement that the plaintiff have trademark rights.  That would be a 
much better reflection of historical practice, which we perhaps disregarded 
without nearly enough thought.   
But what is especially notable about Belmora is its failure to recognize 
the implications of its decision for the territoriality of trademark rights.  
Few concepts are more fundamental in trademark law than the notion that 
rights are territorial in nature.48  As the Ninth Circuit said in Grupo 
Gigante, “[p]riority of trademark rights in the United States depends solely 
upon priority of use in the United States, not on priority of use anywhere in 
the world.  Earlier use in another country usually just does not count.”49   
It is also black-letter law that trademark rights arise in the United 
States through use, and that those rights exist only in the areas of use.50  Of 
course, the Lanham Act also makes it possible to establish rights in 
advance of use by filing an intent-to-use application51 or one of the types of 
applications specifically available to foreign applicants.52  But even those 
provisions ultimately require use in the United States as a condition of 
continued rights.   
It is one thing for courts to make an exception to these bedrock rules 
by recognizing the well-known marks doctrine, under which the owner of a 
well-known trademark can prevent use of that mark even in countries in 
 
(alterations in original))); see also Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du 
Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 362 n.2 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he tests for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition . . . are identical.”); People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001) (using same test for 
both causes of action); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 
930 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]o prevail under §§ 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition, respectively, a complainant must 
demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible [sic] trademark . . . .”).   
 48  ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The principle of 
territoriality is basic to American trademark law.” (citations omitted)).   
 49  Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:2 (4th ed. 2002)); see also Buti v. Perosa, 
S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103–05 (2d Cir. 1998); Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 
1569–70 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 
F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985).   
 50  United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918).   
 51  15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (2012).   
 52  See id. §§ 1126, 1141a.   
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which it has not used or registered.53  That doctrine has, of course, divided 
courts in the United States.54  And while, in our view, the Second Circuit 
was right to reject the doctrine, but there are reasonable arguments to be 
made on both sides of that debate.  But as least the well-known marks 
doctrine makes an exception to the territoriality principle only in a limited 
range of cases—those involving “well-known” marks.55  Belmora 
potentially upends that balance, seemingly making it possible for foreign 
mark owners to prevail not only when their marks are well-known, but 
whenever use of that mark in the United States causes confusion.  That’s no 
longer a limited exception to territoriality—it’s a rejection of it.56   
III.     B & B HARDWARE 
In its 2015 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. decision, 
the Supreme Court resolved a split in the lower courts over whether TTAB 
decisions have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation in federal courts.57  
B & B dealt specifically with the preclusive effect of likelihood of 
 
 53  American courts have tended to refer to the doctrine as the “famous marks” 
doctrine, though it is known internationally as the “well-known marks” doctrine, originating 
as it did with an addition to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention.  Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (requiring member states “ex officio if their 
legislation so permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the 
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an 
imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent 
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being 
already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for 
identical or similar goods” (emphasis added)).   
 54  Compare Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (holding that there is a “famous-mark 
exception” to the territoriality principle), with ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 
159–65 (2d Cir. 2007) (refusing to recognize a famous marks doctrine as a matter of federal 
law); see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 859 (N.Y. 2007) (answering a 
certified question from the Second Circuit regarding a New York law and holding that, 
though New York does not recognize a famous marks doctrine as such, “when a business, 
through renown in New York, possesses goodwill constituting property or a commercial 
advantage in this state, that goodwill is protected from misappropriation under New York 
unfair competition law”).   
 55  Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098 (holding that, for the famous-mark exception to 
apply, secondary meaning is not enough, because “[i]n addition, where the mark has not 
before been used in the American market, the court must be satisfied, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that a substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is 
familiar with the foreign mark”).   
 56  There’s also an interesting, and apparently unrecognized, tension here with the 
Federal Circuit’s suggestion in Tam that unregistrable marks are not protectable.  Marks that 
are never used in interstate commerce in the United States are clearly not registrable, so 
under the Federal Circuit’s formulation, they would not be eligible for protection under 
section 43(a), even if merely unregistered marks would be.   
 57  135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).   
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confusion findings in opposition proceedings.  B & B opposed registration 
of Hargis’s application to register SEALTITE for “self-piercing and self-
drilling metal screws for use in the manufacture of metal and post-frame 
buildings,” claiming the mark was likely to cause confusion in light of 
B & B’s prior registration of SEALTIGHT for “threaded or unthreaded 
metal fasteners and other related hardwar[e]; namely self-sealing nuts, 
bolts, screws, rivets and washers, all having a captive o-ring, for use in the 
aerospace industry.”58  The TTAB agreed with B & B and denied 
registration to Hargis.59   
While the opposition proceeding was pending, B & B sued Hargis in 
federal court for trademark infringement.60 While the civil action was 
pending, the TTAB ruled in B & B’s favor, after which B & B argued that 
“Hargis could not contest likelihood of confusion because of the preclusive 
effect of the TTAB decision.”61  The district court rejected that argument, 
noting that the TTAB is not an Article III court, and the jury proceeded to 
find that there was no likelihood of confusion.62  On appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit accepted “for the sake of argument that agency decisions can 
ground issue preclusion,” but it nevertheless affirmed the judgment in 
Hargis’s favor.63  It did so on the grounds that the TTAB uses different 
likelihood of confusion factors than do courts in the Eighth Circuit; the 
TTAB placed too much emphasis on the appearance and sounds of the 
marks; and the burdens of persuasion were different in the two 
proceedings.64   
The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that the decisions of 
administrative agency tribunals generally, and the TTAB specifically, can 
have preclusive effect.  Regarding TTAB proceedings, the Court held that, 
“[s]o long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met, when 
the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same as those 
before the district court, issue preclusion should apply.”65  More 
specifically the Court held that likelihood of confusion findings made by 
the TTAB can have preclusive effect because the likelihood of confusion 
 
 58  Id. at 1301 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).   
 59  Id. at 1302.   
 60  Id.   
 61  Id. 
 62  Id.   
 63  Id. (citing B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 
2013)).   
 64  Id.  Because of the unique setting of registration proceedings, Hargis bore the 
burden of persuasion at the TTAB, but infringement plaintiffs like B & B always bear the 
burden of persuasion in civil litigation.  See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting 
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118 (2004) (“Section 1115(b) places a burden of proving 
likelihood of confusion (that is, infringement) on the party charging infringement even when 
relying on an incontestable registration.”).   
 65  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1310. 
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standard is the same in the TTAB and in district court infringement 
proceedings.   
But the fact that TTAB determinations can have preclusive effect does 
not mean they always will.  While the same standard nominally applies in 
both settings, the Court understood that the TTAB often will apply that 
standard very differently than would a court in civil litigation.  As the 
Court recognized, “[t]he Board typically analyzes the marks, goods, and 
channels of trade only as set forth in the application and in the opposer’s 
registration, regardless of whether the actual usage of the marks by either 
party differs.”66  And because preclusion applies only when the usages 
adjudicated by the TTAB are “materially the same as those before the 
district court,” the Court acknowledged that it would not apply in “some or 
even many cases”—those in which the usages at issue in district court 
materially differ from those considered by the TTAB.67   
Many observers predicted that the practical effect of B & B would be 
minimal, since it would be a rare case in which the TTAB actually 
considered uses that were materially the same as those considered by the 
district court in subsequent litigation.  And those predictions have largely 
proven accurate in the likelihood of confusion context.  Indeed, aside from 
the Eighth Circuit’s decision on remand in B & B itself,68 courts have 
refused to give TTAB likelihood of confusion determinations preclusive 
effect.69   
 
 66  Id. at 1307 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 23, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 
13-352)); see Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(refusing to consider evidence that the goods the parties sold in the marketplace were not 
identical, because “the Board must look to the registrations themselves to determine the 
scope of the goods covered by the contested mark” (citations omitted)); Octocom Sys., Inc. 
v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion 
that the question of registrability” is decided in the registration context on the basis of the 
parties’ registration submissions “regardless of what the record may reveal as to the 
particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the class of 
purchasers to which sales of the goods are directed.” (citations omitted)); see also U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 17, § 1207.01 (stating that the focus of ex parte 
examination is on use described in application).  For a more complete description of the 
differences between PTO proceedings and infringement analysis in district court, see 
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 892–99.   
 67  B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1308, 1310. 
 68  B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 800 F.3d 427, 427 (8th Cir. 2015) (per 
curiam).   
 69  See, e.g., CSL Silicones Inc. v. Midsun Grp. Inc., 170 F.3d 304, 319 (D. Conn. 
2016) (not giving TTAB likelihood of confusion finding preclusive effect because civil 
litigation would involve a different set of transactional facts); see also Paleteria La 
Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. DE C.V., 188 F. Supp. 3d 22, 37 
(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1701 (2012) (holding that district 
courts reviewing TTAB decisions make findings of fact de novo, and that it was unable to 
“meaningfully defer” to TTAB factual findings in this particular case “because the TTAB, 
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Courts have given TTAB decisions preclusive effect in other contexts, 
however.  In Ashe v. PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., the court gave 
preclusive effect to the TTAB’s priority determination, noting that it had 
“previously found that the issue of priority determined in an earlier 
proceeding before the Trademark Board ‘is identical to priority of use in an 
infringement suit.’”70  The Eastern District of Virginia also gave preclusive 
effect to a TTAB decision involving fraud on the PTO.71  According to the 
court, “[t]he issue of whether Defendant committed fraud on the USPTO 
[was] identical to the question considered by the TTAB in the prior 
proceeding.”72  And all of the predicate conditions for preclusion applied: 
“the determination of fraud was critical and necessary to the TTAB's 
final decision,” “[t]he TTAB's decision [was] considered final and valid,” 
and “Defendant was represented by counsel before the TTAB, and had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of fraud in the prior 
proceeding.”73   
In Vaad L’Hafotzas Sichos, Inc. v. Kehot Publication Society, the 
court suggested, though only in dicta, that a TTAB determination of 
trademark validity would have preclusive effect.74  That case dealt 
primarily with likelihood of confusion, but in a prior opinion involving the 
same parties, the court held that Merkos was the owner of the Kehot logo, 
“which [was] indeed a trademark.”75  The court noted that no new evidence 
was presented in the later action “to countermand the Court’s determination 
that there was substantial evidence to support that conclusion.”76  Even if 
such evidence had been presented, the court continued, “it [was] likely the 
TTAB’s decision [rejecting Vaad’s opposition] would have had preclusive 
effect.”77  Ultimately, the court did not believe it was necessary to decide 
the preclusion issue, however, “because the Court’s disposition of the case 
would remain unchanged.”78   
Courts have otherwise read B & B relatively narrowly, in particular by 
concluding that B & B applies only to inter partes proceedings and not to 
 
in many respects, considered a ‘different set of facts’ [regarding likelihood of confusion] 
than has been presented here”)).   
 70  165 F. Supp. 357, 362 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Coryn Group II, LLC v. O.C. 
Seacrets, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1547, 1550 (D. Md. 2011)).     
 71  Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Ahmad, 155 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2015).   
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. (citation omitted). 
 74  156 F. Supp. 3d 363, 368 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).   
 75  Id. at 368 (referring to Vadd L’Hafotzas Sichos, Inc. v. Kehot Publ’n Soc’y, 935 F. 
Supp. 2d 595, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)).   
 76  Id.   
 77  Id. at 368 n.2 (citing B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 
1310 (2015)). 
 78  Id.  
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ex parte registration decisions.79  In In re Cordua Restaurants, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s affirmance of the Trademark Office’s 
refusal to register a stylized version of the word CHURRASCOS.80   
 
                    
  
The Trademark Office rejected the application on the ground that the 
mark was generic, despite the fact that the applicant owned prior 
registration of the same word mark in standard characters.  The Board 
affirmed that refusal, and the Federal Circuit specifically held that 
“Cordua's existing registration of the CHURRASCOS word mark (the ’321 
Registration) d[id] not preclude a finding that the stylized form of the mark 
is generic.”81   
The Federal Circuit also rejected Cordua’s argument that “the 
examiner's determination that the CHURRASCOS word mark is 
trademark-eligible is binding on this case as a matter of issue preclusion.”82  
According to the court, while TTAB decisions in inter partes opposition 
proceedings may have preclusive effect, “there [was] no suggestion in 
B & B Hardware that an examiner's decision to register a mark or to refuse 
registration satisfies the traditional requirements of issue preclusion.”83  
Thus, the Trademark Office’s prior decision to register the standard 
character mark was not preclusive against the Office in the context of the 
application to register the stylized version of the mark.84   
 
 79  See Progressive Distrib. Servs., Inc. v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 
741, 749 (W.D. Mich. 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-1830 (6th Cir. June 17, 2016)  
(“Because the USPTO’s rejection of UPS’s mark was a low-level determination, and there is 
no indication in the record that the examining attorney reviewed the evidence presented to 
this Court in the instant case, this Court declines to give any weight to the PTO examiner’s 
likelihood of confusion determination.”).   
 80  823 F.3d 594, 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016).   
 81  Id. at 599.   
 82  Id. at 601 n.2.   
 83  Id. (citations omitted); see also Progressive Distrib. Servs., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d at 
749 (declining, without even citing B & B, to give any weight to the Trademark Examiner’s 
likelihood of confusion determination, because “the USPTO’s rejection of UPS’s mark was 
a low-level determination, and there is no indication in the record that the examining 
attorney reviewed the evidence presented to this Court in the instant case”).   
 84  In re Cordua, 823 F.3d at 607.  On the merits, that holding is difficult to square 
with the Trademark Office’s own rule that standard character marks include all stylizations.  
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 19, § 1207.01(c)(iii) (2017) (“A 
registrant is entitled to all depictions of a standard character mark regardless of the font 
style, size, or color, and not merely ‘reasonable manners’ of depicting such mark.” (citations 
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IV.     REMEDIES  
Courts have become more deeply divided over the last few years 
regarding the requirements for injunctive relief in trademark cases.  Until 
relatively recently, most courts maintained that likelihood of confusion 
presumptively caused irreparable harm.85  That old rule was created at a 
time when trademark infringement focused on cases of competing goods, 
and it probably made good sense in that context.  Use of a mark by direct 
competitors implicated both producer and consumer interests, threatening 
both to divert sales from the mark owner and to defraud consumers.  As 
trademark law has expanded over the last several decades, however, it is 
substantially less clear how the various activities trademark law reaches 
harm either mark owners or consumers.  And while courts have tended to 
accept modern harm stories as a general matter, some courts’ doubts about 
their validity influenced the ways they think about irreparable harm and the 
availability of injunctive relief.   
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court rejected a 
presumption of injunctive relief in patent cases, holding that the typical 
equitable principles “apply with equal force to disputes arising under the 
Patent Act.”86  In order to obtain an injunction:  
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, 
are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.87   
eBay has had some meaningful effect in certain categories of patent cases, 
particularly those involving non-practicing entities,88 and every court that 
 
omitted)).  If the standard character mark is not generic, it is hard to imagine how a more 
distinctive version of that mark could be generic.  But of course, it’s hard to square the 
standard rule with the idea that stylized versions of previously-registered standard character 
marks are registrable.  If those standard character marks really include all stylizations, then a 
stylized version of that mark is not a different mark worthy of separate registration.  For a 
discussion of the difficulty of standard character marks see Tushnet, supra note 15, at 882–
84.   
 85  See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d 800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998); Tally-
Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1029 (11th Cir. 1989); Processed Plastic 
Co. v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1982).   
 86  547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).   
 87  Id. (citations omitted).   
 88  See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation after eBay: 
An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2016) (finding that “eBay has 
effectively created a bifurcated regime for patent remedies, as operating companies who 
compete against an infringer still obtain permanent injunctions in the vast majority of cases 
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has considered the question has recognized eBay’s applicability in 
trademark law as well.  But courts have reached different conclusions about 
the extent of eBay’s effect in trademark cases.89   
In Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment 
Management, Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized eBay’s applicability to 
trademark cases, holding that just as “[n]othing in the Patent Act 
indicate[d] that Congress intended such a departure” from standard 
equitable principles in patent cases, neither did anything in the Lanham Act 
indicate such a departure in trademark cases.90  According to the Ninth 
Circuit, irreparable harm cannot be presumed; a plaintiff must provide 
evidence of irreparable harm, and it must do so with more than “cursory 
and conclusory” statements.91  “Gone are the days when once the plaintiff 
in an infringement action has established a likelihood of confusion, it is 
ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if 
injunctive relief does not issue.”92   
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have tended to read Herb Reed 
broadly, and several have denied injunctive relief in cases in which 
irreparable injury once would have been presumed.93  In Café Foundation, 
Inc. v. Seeley, for example, the court emphasized that “past consumer 
confusion does not demonstrate a likelihood of future harm.”94  While 
 
that are successfully litigated to judgment,” but non-practicing entities almost always are 
denied injunctive relief).   
 89  Commentators are also somewhat divided about how eBay should be interpreted in 
the trademark context.  See Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark 
Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808677; 
Rebecca Tushnet, What’s the Harm of Trademark Infringement, 49 AKRON L. REV. 627 
(2016).   
 90  736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting eBay, 547 
U.S. at 391–92); see also San Miguel Pure Foods Co. v. Ramar Int’l Corp., 625 F. App’x 
322, 327 (9th Cir. 2015); Titaness Light Shop, LLC v. Sunlight Supply, Inc. 585 F. App’x 
390, 391 (9th Cir. 2014).   
 91  Herb Reed Enters., 736 F.3d at 1250.   
 92  Id. at 1250 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. 
W. Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1987)).    
 93  See Cafe Found., Inc. v. Seeley, No. 16-cv-0628, 2016 WL 1258624, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2016); Hakkasan LV, LLC v. Miller, No. 2:15-cv-0290, 2016 WL 1064473, at 
*4 (D. Nev. Mar. 17, 2016); Arcsoft, Inc. v. Cyberlink Corp., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1071 
(N.D. Cal. 2015); Alto Velo Racing Club v. Rouleur Sports Grp., LLC, No. 5:15-cv-2144, 
2015 WL 5462055, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015); Sec. Alarm Fin. Enters., L.P. v. Alarm 
Prot. Tech., LLC, No. 3:13-cv-0102, 2015 WL 3459415, at *2 (D. Alaska June 1, 2015); 
Cutting Edge Solutions, LLC v. Sustainable Low Maint. Grass, LLC, No. 14-cv-2770, 2014 
WL 5361548, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014); Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. 
Servs., Inc., No. C 12-3856, 2014 WL 4312021, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2014); AFD 
China Intellectual Prop. Law (USA) Office, Inc. v. AFD China Intellectual Prop. Law 
Office, No. 3:09-cv-1509, 2014 WL 2619644, at *6 (D. Or. June 12, 2014).   
 94  Cafe Found., No. 16-cv-0628, 2016 WL 1258624, at *7 (citing Herb Reed Enters., 
736 F.3d at 1250–51).   
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“evidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to 
goodwill can support a finding of irreparable harm,” the claim that the 
plaintiff “could suffer harm in the form of damaged goodwill is nothing 
more than an unsupported and conclusory statements [sic] regarding harm 
[Plaintiff] might suffer.”95  Similarly, the court denied preliminary 
injunctive relief in Hakkasan LV, LLC v. Miller (a cybersquatting case) 
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate irreparable harm from the 
defendant’s registration of domain names that were similar to the 
plaintiff’s.96  In particular, plaintiff could not “even quantify the number of 
internet users who ha[d] mistakenly used Miller’s services and not 
Hakkasan’s, or who w[ould] refuse to visit Hakkasan’s Las Vegas 
nightclub due to confusion between Chakkasan.comD and 
Chakkasanlv.comD and Miller’s Contested Domain Names.”97   Nor was 
there any “evidence that [the defendant] ha[d] taken any steps to compete 
with [plaintiff’s] business beyond registering the Contested Domain Names 
and offering them for sale.”98   
The Third Circuit has followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead, emphasizing 
the need to “demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely” in Lanham Act 
cases.99  And some district courts in the Third Circuit have denied 
injunctive relief due to lack of irreparable harm.  In 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Sodhi, 
for example, the court refused to grant injunctive relief even though the 
plaintiff proved likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark 
infringement claim because plaintiff could not show that irreparable harm 
was likely.100   
But district courts in the Third Circuit do not seem universally to have 
given up on the idea that evidence of consumer confusion establishes 
 
 95  Id. at *7–8 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Herb Reed 
Enters., 736 F.3d at 1250).   
 96  No. 2:15-CV-290, 2015 WL 751094, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 23, 2015); see also 
Williams v. Green Valley RV, Inc., No. 8:15-CV-1010, 2015 WL 4694075 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
6, 2015).   
 97  Hakkasan LV, No. 2:15-CV-290, 2015 WL 751094, at *2 (citation omitted).   
 98  Id.   
 99  Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Ferring involved a false advertising claim under section 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012), but the court emphasized eBay’s applicability to all Lanham Act 
cases.  Id. at 214.     
 100  No. 13-3715, 2016 WL 541135, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2016) (noting that “Plaintiff 
relie[d] primarily on two forms of harm: harm to reputation as evidenced by customer 
complaints and harm to the property stemming from Defendants' unauthorized occupation of 
the Stores,” and finding that, while these types of harm might support injunctive relief, 
“Plaintiff ha[d] not sufficiently demonstrated that these forms of harm ha[d] occurred or 
[were] likely to occur”); see also Congoo, LLC v. Revcontent LLC, No. 16-401, 2016 WL 
1547171, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2016); Dunkin Donuts Franchising LLC v. Claudia III, 
LLC, No. 14-2293, 2014 WL 3900569, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2014); Buzz Bee Toys, Inc. 
v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483, 510 (D.N.J. 2014).   
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irreparable harm.  In Astrazeneca AB v. Camber Pharmaceuticals, Inc., for 
example, the court found that the defendant’s use of the color purple for its 
generic pills would “create (and [was] intended to create) the false 
impression that its generic esomeprazole magnesium capsules are identical 
to Nexium®, not merely bioequivalent, and may be an ‘authorized 
generic,’ that is, a generic drug made or authorized by the brand name 
company.”101  On that basis, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
conduct put “at risk [Astrazeneca]’s reputation” and that [Astrazeneca] had 
therefore “demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm.”102   
Some other courts have affirmed eBay’s application to trademark law 
without clearly ruling on the question of whether likelihood of consumer 
confusion will continue to establish irreparable harm.103  In JL Powell 
Clothing LLC v. Powell, for example, the First Circuit remanded the case to 
the district court, noting that “[t]here ha[d] also been no addressing of the 
plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on its related intellectual property claim to 
the trademark ‘J.L. Powell’—and so no express finding on customer 
confusion (or the difficulty of establishing the damage from any such 
confusion)—that might support a finding of irreparable harm.”104  The 
parenthetical is notable for the ambiguity it adds regarding eBay’s effect, 
and it echoes earlier First Circuit cases that acknowledged the possibility 
that eBay had called into doubt the viability of a presumption of irreparable 
harm but that avoided ruling directly on the question.105   
The Eleventh Circuit is quite unclear.  In Hoop Culture, Inc. v. GAP 
Inc., the court acknowledged that eBay had called into question the circuit’s 
previous practice of presuming irreparable harm once the plaintiff in a 
 
 101  No. 15-927, 2015 WL 7307101, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 19, 2015).   
 102  Id.   
 103  For a thorough survey of courts’ approaches to eBay, see Peter J. Karol, 
Trademark’s eBay Problem, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 625 (2016).  
Karol puts circuits (other than the Ninth and Third) into three groups: “Noncommittal or 
Equivocating Circuits (First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits),” “Circuits Endorsing Use of a 
Presumption after eBay (Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits),” and “Circuits that Have Not 
Directly Addressed the Applicability of eBay to Trademark Law but Where District Courts 
Have Attempted to Do So (Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits).”  Id. at 637–51.    
 104  590 F. App’x 3, 6 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).   
 105  See Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. #19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir. 
2013) (per curiam) (avoiding the question of whether irreparable harm can be presumed 
from confusion, but noting that “[w]hether or not the presumption of irreparable harm 
remains viable in this context, it is difficult to see how irreparable harm could be established 
without a finding of confusion”); Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, 
Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is unnecessary to decide at this time whether the 
rule relied upon by the district court (i.e., irreparable harm is presumed upon a finding of 
likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement claim) is consistent with 
such principles, because—even if we assume without deciding that such rule is good law—
we still find that the district court abused its discretion in applying such a presumption 
here.”).   
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trademark case established a likelihood of success on the merits.106  The 
court further emphasized that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must show 
that irreparable harm is “likely, not merely possible.”107  Yet the court 
expressly disclaimed making any “express holding about the effect of eBay 
on this specific case or [the] circuit’s presumption of irreparable harm more 
generally.”108  And it left open the possibility that irreparable harm might 
be presumed in some cases: “All of this is not to say that a presumption of 
irreparable harm or something like it will never be an appropriate exercise 
of the district court's equitable discretion.”109  In the particular case, 
however, the court found that “the district court’s findings of facts were 
sufficient to rebut any presumption of irreparable harm that may have 
applied,” so an injunction was unwarranted regardless of eBay’s effect.110   
Neither the Second nor the Eighth Circuit has yet addressed the issue, 
but district courts in those circuits seem to be moving towards abolishing 
the presumption.  In Ann Clark, Ltd. v. R & M International, Corp., for 
example, the District of Vermont noted that “the presumption of irreparable 
injury [when likelihood of confusion is shown] is no longer in effect.”111  
And in JDR Industries, Inc. v. McDowell, the court stated, “[t]he Court 
does not presume irreparable harm based solely on its finding of likely (or 
actual) confusion.”112   
 
 106  648 F. App’x 981, 984–85 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing N. Am. Med. Corp. 
v. Axiom Worldwide, 522 F.3d 1211, 1227 (11th Cir. 2008)).   
 107  Id. at 985 (citation omitted).   
 108  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit had previously held that eBay was applicable to 
trademark cases but “decline[d] to decide whether the district court was correct in its 
holding that the nature of the trademark infringement gives rise to a presumption of 
irreparable injury.”  N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1228.   
 109  Hoop Culture, 648 F. App’x at 985.   
 110  Id.  The Tenth Circuit has similarly avoided the eBay question, acknowledging the 
issue once but declining to address it.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 213 F. App’x 654, 
657 (10th Cir. 2007) (“We need not consider how eBay may apply in this context, however, 
because in any event Lorillard has not shown that any harm Lorillard would suffer in the 
absence of an injunction outweighed the potential harm to I and G if an injunction were 
granted.”).   
 111  No. 1:14-CV-143, 2014 WL 7392026, at *3 (D. Vt. Dec. 29, 2014) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Marks Org., Inc. v. Joles, 784 F. Supp. 2d 322, 334 (S.D.N.Y.2011)).  
Ann Clark suggested that Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010), was the reason for 
the change.  Salinger was a copyright case in which the court explicitly rejected its former 
rule that irreparable harm is presumed when a plaintiff proves infringement.  Salinger, 607 
F.3d at 74–75.  It rejected that presumption on the ground it was inconsistent with eBay.  Id. 
at 79.   
 112  121 F. Supp. 3d 872, 891 (D. Neb. 2015) (first citing Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. 
Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206 (3d Cir. 2014); and then citing Herb Reed Enters., 
LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also Plasti Dip Int’l 
Inc. v. Rust-Oleum Brands Co., No. 14-1831, 2014 WL 7183789, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 
2014).   
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In other circuits, eBay seems not to have changed very much.  Thus 
far, no court in the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Circuits has denied injunctive 
relief on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish irreparable harm 
despite evidence of confusion.  The Fifth Circuit has even explicitly 
reaffirmed the presumption of irreparable harm: “All that must be proven to 
establish liability and the need for an injunction against infringement is the 
likelihood of confusion—injury is presumed.”113    
V.     NOMINATIVE FAIR USE  
The concept of nominative fair use is primarily associated with the 
Ninth Circuit, which developed the terminology in New Kids on the 
Block.114  Though no circuit has affirmatively rejected the doctrine, most 
circuits have not expressly accepted it either.  And since the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., the law has 
been divided in terms of which party bears the burden on the nominative 
fair use question and the relationship of nominative fair use to the 
likelihood of confusion factors.115  The Second Circuit’s recent decision in 
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, Inc. 
v. Security University, LLC deepened that division.116   
In its New Kids decision, the Ninth Circuit held that use of another’s 
mark is not actionable when it meets the following three conditions:  
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the 
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in 
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.117   
Though it seems clear that the New Kids court meant the third factor to 
refer to additional conduct beyond mere use of the mark that would suggest 
sponsorship or affiliation, courts applying New Kids often reduced the third 
factor to a confusion inquiry.  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held that the New 
Kids factors replaced the likelihood of confusion factors and that a 
 
 113  Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting 5 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 30:2 (4th ed. 
2001)).   
 114  New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–09 (9th Cir. 
1992).  Nominative fair use’s only appearance in the Lanham Act is in section 43(c)(3)(A), 
exclusions from dilution liability.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012).   
 115  425 F.3d 211, 222–24 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 116  823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 117  New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (footnote omitted).   
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defendant arguing nominative fair use had the burden of proving that the 
use would not cause confusion.118   
Lendingtree rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach of substituting the 
nominative fair use analysis for evaluation of the likelihood of confusion 
factors.119  It did so in part because the Ninth Circuit’s approach had the 
effect of shifting to the defendant the burden of proving lack of confusion, 
which the Third Circuit believed was in tension with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in KP Permanent.120  The Third Circuit therefore emphasized that, 
in a nominative fair use case, the plaintiff retained the burden of first 
proving that confusion was likely.  But the court also acknowledged that 
many of the confusion factors would not be well-suited to a nominative fair 
use case, and it therefore focused on only four of the factors as relevant in 
such a case.121   
In Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, the Ninth Circuit 
maintained that the New Kids factors replace the likelihood of confusion 
factors in a nominative fair use case, and it faulted the district court for 
treating nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to be evaluated after 
the plaintiff established likelihood of confusion under the Sleekcraft 
factors.122  But to avoid the burden-shifting problem, Tabari made clear 
that, because the New Kids factors replace the likelihood of confusion 
factors, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s use is 
not nominative fair use.123   
The Second Circuit deviated from both of those approaches in 
International Information Systems, specifically rejecting Century 21 v. 
Lendingtree and holding that nominative fair use is not an affirmative 
defense to a trademark infringement claim.124  According to the Second 
Circuit, the statutory fair use defense does not encompass nominative fair 
use because nominative use is “not the use of a name, term, or device 
otherwise than as a mark which is descriptive of and used merely to 
 
 118  See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 908 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(shifting the burden to the defendant).   
 119  Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d at 222–24.   
 120  Id. at 222–23; see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 
U.S. 111, 121–22 (2004) (“Since the burden of proving likelihood of confusion rests with 
the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show confusion 
unlikely, it follows (contrary to the Court of Appeals's view) that some possibility of 
consumer confusion must be compatible with fair use, and so it is.”).   
 121  Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d at 222, 225–26.   
 122  610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341 (9th Cir. 1979)).   
 123  Id. at 1183.   
 124  Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 
153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016).  
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describe the goods or services of the alleged infringer.”125  Nominative use 
instead “involves using the mark at issue as a mark to specifically invoke 
the mark-holder’s mark, rather than its use, other than as a mark, to 
describe the alleged infringer’s goods or services.”126  And because 
Congress did not make such use a defense to trademark infringement, 
nominative fair use cannot be deemed an affirmative defense.127   
Given that (non)status, the court held, the nominative fair use factors 
cannot supplant the likelihood of confusion factors.  Instead, district courts 
are to consider the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use 
factors in addition to the Polaroid factors.128  Indeed, the Second Circuit 
specifically reiterated that, when considering the nominative fair use 
factors, courts must not “consider only source confusion, but rather must 
consider confusion regarding affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by 
the mark holder.”129   
VI.     INITIAL INTEREST CONFUSION  
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., reflects the continuation of initial interest confusion’s 
slow death.130  For the last several years, courts in jurisdictions that had 
previously embraced initial interest confusion have been cutting the 
doctrine back, primarily by emphasizing labeling and context and refusing 
to assume that mere searching indicates confusion.  In its 1-800 Contacts 
decision, for example, the Tenth Circuit rejected an initial interest 
confusion claim based on use of “1-800 CONTACTS” and related terms as 
AdWords (advertisement program offered by Google) keywords.131  
According to the court, even initial interest confusion was unlikely because 
the advertisements shown on the search results page were clearly labeled as 
such, and those ads unambiguously identified the source of the ads.132  The 
Ninth Circuit also had previously emphasized the labeling of ads in its 
Network Automation decision.  There the court held that use of the 
 
 125  Id. (citing Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough–Pond’s USA Co., 125 
F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir.1997)). 
 126  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 127  Id. at 167–68.   
 128  Id. at 168.  See generally Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d 
Cir. 1961) (listing factors to consider).   
 129  Int’l Info. Sys., 823 F.3d. at 169 (citing Courtenay Commc’ns Corp. v. Hall, 334 
F.3d 210, 213 n.1 (2d Cir.2003)).   
 130  804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015).   
 131  1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1234 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 132  Id. at 1245 (“Perhaps in the abstract, one who searches for a particular business 
with a strong mark and sees an entry on the results page will naturally infer that the entry is 
for that business.  But that inference is an unnatural one when the entry is clearly labeled as 
an advertisement and clearly identifies the source, which has a name quite different from the 
business being searched for.”).  
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plaintiff’s mark as a keyword was not likely to cause confusion in large 
part because of “the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the 
surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.”133   
These cases did not entirely close the door on initial interest 
confusion, as both of them implied that a claim could still be pursued 
against the user of a keyword whose advertisements were not sufficiently 
clearly labeled, even if any confusion that was caused by the ads might be 
dispelled when users clicked on them.  But the increasing focus on the 
context of the search results page (rather than assumptions about users’ 
intent when entering search terms) was moving initial interest confusion 
closer to point-of-sale confusion and away from the mere use of keywords.   
MTM v. Amazon doubled down on that contextual approach, noting 
that the labeling and appearance of the products for sale on Amazon’s web 
page was the most important factor in assessing initial interest confusion.134  
In that case, MTM sued Amazon for trademark infringement for generating 
a search results page in response to searches for “mtm special ops”—
MTM’s registered trademark for watches.  Amazon, which did not sell 
MTM watches, displayed the following page:135  
 
 133  Network Automation, Inc. v. Adv. Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  
 134  Multi Time Mach., 804 F.3d at 930.   
 135  Id. at 933–34.   
     Consumers who go onto Amazon.com and search for the term “mtm special 
ops” are directed to a search results page.  On the search results page, the search 
query used—here, “mtm special ops”—is displayed twice: in the search query box 
and directly below the search query box in what is termed a “breadcrumb.”  The 
breadcrumb displays the original query, “mtm special ops,” in quotation marks to 
provide a trail for the consumer to follow back to the original search.  Directly 
below the breadcrumb, is a “Related Searches” field, which provides the 
consumer with alternative search queries in case the consumer is dissatisfied with 
the results of the original search.  Here, the Related Search that is suggested to the 
consumer is: “mtm special ops watch.”  Directly below the “Related Searches” 
field is a gray bar containing the text “Showing 10 Results.”  Then, directly below 
the gray bar is Amazon's product listings.  The gray bar separates the product 
listings from the breadcrumb and the “Related Searches” field.   
Id. 
2017] 2 0 1 6  T R A D E M A R K  Y E A R  I N  R E V I E W  137 
         
 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the multi-factor likelihood of 
confusion test was not “particularly apt” in a case like this.   
[T]he Sleekcraft test was developed for a different problem—i.e., for 
analyzing whether two competing brands’ marks are sufficiently similar 
to cause consumer confusion.  Although the present case involves 
brands that compete with MTM, such as Luminox, Chase–Durer, 
TAWATEC, and Modus, MTM does not contend that the marks for 
these competing brands are similar to its trademarks.136   
Unlike a standard trademark case, MTM argued that the search page, which 
displayed the “mtm special ops” search term, was likely to confuse 
consumers because it did not explicitly inform searchers that Amazon does 
 
 136  Id. at 936 (citation omitted).   
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not carry MTM watches.137  Thus, the court focused primarily on the nature 
of the goods at issue (here, expensive watches) and the type of consumer.   
Like the Tenth Circuit in 1-800 Contacts, the court in MTM v. Amazon 
was convinced that the labeling and appearance of the search results page 
was the most important factor in the case.  As the Ninth Circuit had 
previously indicated, labeling can eliminate the likelihood of initial interest 
confusion in cases involving Internet search terms.138  And here the 
labeling was clear: “Because Amazon clearly labels each of the products 
for sale by brand name and model number accompanied by a photograph of 
the item, it is unreasonable to suppose that the reasonably prudent 
consumer accustomed to shopping online would be confused about the 
source of the goods.”139   
Indeed, the labeling was sufficient to prevent even initial interest 
confusion:  
     MTM argues that initial interest confusion might occur because 
Amazon lists the search term used—here the trademarked phrase “mtm 
special ops”—three times at the top of the search page.  MTM argues 
that because Amazon lists the search term “mtm special ops” at the top 
of the page, a consumer might conclude that the products displayed are 
types of MTM watches.  But, merely looking at Amazon’s search 
results page shows that such consumer confusion is highly unlikely.  
None of these watches is labeled with the word “MTM” or the phrase 
“Special Ops,” let alone the specific phrase “MTM Special Ops.”  
Further, some of the products listed are not even watches.  The sixth 
result is a book entitled “Survive!: The Disaster, Crisis and Emergency 
Handbook by Jerry Ahem.”  The tenth result is a book entitled “The 
Moses Expedition: A Novel by Juan Gómez-Jurado.”  No reasonably 
prudent consumer, accustomed to shopping online or not, would assume 
that a book entitled “The Moses Expedition” is a type of MTM watch or 
is in any way affiliated with MTM watches.  Likewise, no reasonably 
prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online would view 
Amazon’s search results page and conclude that the products offered are 
MTM watches.140   
The court also specifically rejected MTM’s argument that, in order to 
eliminate the likelihood of confusion, Amazon needed to “change its search 
results page so that it explain[ed] to customers that it d[id] not offer MTM 
watches for sale before suggesting alternative watches to the customer.”141  
In the court’s view, “[t]he search results page makes clear to anyone who 
can read English that Amazon carries only the brands that are clearly and 
 
 137  Id.   
 138  Id. at 937.   
 139  Id. at 938.   
 140  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 141  Id.   
2017] 2 0 1 6  T R A D E M A R K  Y E A R  I N  R E V I E W  139 
explicitly listed on the web page.  The search results page is 
unambiguous—not unlike when someone walks into a diner, asks for a 
Coke, and is told ‘No Coke. Pepsi.’”142   
 
 
 142  Id. (citation omitted). 
